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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a medium-size broker-dealer firm in Boca Raton, FL was
found liable in an arbitration proceeding for mishandling an elderly couple's
On July 26, 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved the consolidation of
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and NYSE Regulation, Inc. into a single self-
regulating organization named the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). FINRA now
handles all of the regulatory functions of the NASD, including arbitration. Therefore, NASD has
changed its name to FINRA with regard to its regulatory functions, and any reference in this article to
NASD is likewise a reference to FINRA. News Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Gives
Regulatory Approval for NASD and NYSE Consolidation (July 26, 2007) (2007 WL 21358805).
Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center of Nova Southeastern University; B. A.,
Cornell University;J.D. Boston College. Professor Cane is the co-author of SECURITIESARBITRATION:
LAWAND PROCEDURE (BNA Books 1991) and numerous articles concerning dispute resolution in the
securities arena. She has also served as Chair of the Corporations/Securities Committee of The Florida
Bar Business Law Section.
J.D. Graduate 2007, Shepard Broad Law Center of Nova Southeastern University. Ilya
Torchinsky was the 2006-07 Editor-in-ChiefoflLSAjournal of International & Comparative Law. Mr.
Torchinsky also served as an assistant coach in figure skating in 2002 Salt Lake City Winter
Olympics. After successfully passing Florida Bar, Mr. Torchinsky co-founded a sports management
company Morozov Sports Management, LLC.
I C.S. Lewis Quotes, http://myfamousquotes.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (follow "Search
by Last Name" hyperlink; then follow "L" hyperlink; then follow "Lewis, C.S." hyperlink).
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last savings, a scenario so common that even the news-hungry sharks of the
local TV station would not find it worthy of broadcast. The couple was
awarded $12,000 while claiming damages in excess of $600,000. The final
award, produced by the arbitration panel, contained no explanation of the
panel's rationale. The couple will spend its last golden years next to
poverty, getting by only on Social Security. Imagine their securities broker
had been astutely and carefully managing her clients' funds for decades
when she is caught up in an arbitration proceeding alleging that she is liable
to her life-long clients because she recommended unsuitable investments
that were touted by her firm. It is her position that the firm, in effect, lied
to her about the suitability of the investment for her clients. Again, assume
the arbitration panel finds her liable for forty percent of the award, but
doesn't explain why she is liable or why for forty percent. Neither the
elderly couple nor the broker would be likely to challenge the arbitration
award in court. The statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award are
very limited.2 Moreover, it would be an exercise in futility to allege the
panel's breach of manifest disregard of the law standard absent explanatory
language in the record.
Arguably, to combat investor complaints and to give more credibility to
this self-regulatory organization ("SRO"), the National Association of
Securities Dealer Regulation ("NASD DR") announced onJanuary 27,2005
its intention to amend a rule requiring arbitrators to explain their decisions.3
The Code of Arbitration Procedure would be amended "to provide written
explanations in arbitration awards upon the request of customers ....
This proposal also provided that such written explanations could be
requested by individual brokers in intra-industry arbitrations.'
In order for a proposed rule to take effect, it must be consistent with the
provisions of Section 15A(b) (6) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
which requires, inter alia, that NASD's rules be designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promotejust and equitable
principles of trade, and, in general, to protect investors and the public
2 See 9 U.S.C. S 10(a) (2000) (discussing the statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration
award). Manifest disregard is a court-created, rather than statutory basis for vacating an award. See infra
note 14 and accompanying text.
3 NASD, News Release: New Arbitration Rule Requires Award Explanations Upon Investor
Request (Jan. 27,2005), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2005NewsReleases/P013145.
4 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Provide Written Explanations in Arbitration
Awards Upon the Request of Customers, or of Associated Persons in Industry Controversies, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-52,009,70 Fed. Reg. 41,065,41,065 (proposedJuly 15,2005) [hereinafter Proposed
Rule].
s See id.
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interest.6 "NASD believes that allowing customers and associated persons in
industry disputes to request explained decisions will enhance investor
confidence in the fairness of NASD's arbitration forum."
7
This article will evaluate the likely success of the proposed amendment,
first, by briefly revisiting the arbitration history and source of its authority;
second, by pointing out practical difficulties in applying the manifest
disregard of the law standard; and third, by critiquing the language of the
proposed rule. Finally, the article will conclude with the authors' own
interpretations and resolutions of this issue.
II. SECURITIES ARBITRATION: OVERVIEW
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), which
requires Article III courts to enforce contracts that provide for arbitration as
a remedy.9 However, not until 1985 was there clarity as to the enforceability
of a predispute agreement to arbitrate. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. vs. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the United States Supreme Court stated:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than ajudicial, forum. It trades the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.1"
In the late 1980s, the United States Supreme Court specifically upheld
the validity of pre-dispute arbitration agreements between customers and
brokers and brokerage firms under both the Securities Exchange Act and the
Securities Act."
6 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2006).
7 Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 41,066.
8 Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213,43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(2000)).
9 Joseph R. Grodin,Arbitration ofEmployment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine andPolicy in the Wake
of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1996).
10 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
11 See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (Exchange Act
claims); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearsorn/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,485-86 (1989) (Securities Act
claims). See generally MARlLYN BLUMBERG CANE& PATRICIAA. SHUB, SECURITIESARBITRATION: LAW
AND PROCEDURE 232-45, 255-67 (BNA Books 1991) (explaining how arbitration of disputes became
a part of the securities industry).
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III. PROPOSED RULE
As the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") notes, "[t] he lack
of reasoning or explanations in [arbitration] awards is one of the most
common complaints of non-prevailing participants in NASD's arbitration
forum."A
2
NASD currently handles ninety percent of securities-related disputes
among various U.S. markets and exchanges. 13 In 2006, NASD was the
forum for 4614 new arbitration cases filed and 7212 cases were closed.
14
At present, the NASD Code ofArbitration Rule 10330(e) requires only
limited factual information, including a summary of the issues and the relief
requested and awarded. 5 Although the arbitrators may include the rationale
underlying their decision in the award, they are not required to do so. 16 "In
order to increase investor confidence in the fairness of the NASD arbitration
process, NASD is proposing to amend the Code to allow customers or
associated persons in industry controversies to require an explained
decision.
17
An "explained decision" is described in the Written Explanations as a
"fact-based award that states the reason(s) each alleged cause of action was
granted or denied and will address all claims involved in the case, whether
brought by the party requesting the explained decision or another party" to
the arbitration. 18  This "explained decision" may be requested by the
customer or associated person regardless ofwhether she or he is the claimant
or respondent. 9
12 Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 41,065.
13 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, SECURITIES EXcHANGES-NASD DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 1
COMMERcIALARBITRATION S 28:10 (2007),WL, CMLARB s. 28:10. See also About NASD - Corporate
Description, available at http://www.nasd.com/AboutNASD/CorporateInformation/Corporate
Description/index.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
14 FINRA, Arbitration and Mediation-Dispute Resolution Statistics, http'V/www.fmra.org (last
visited Oct. 19, 2007) (follow "Arbitration & Mediation" hyperlink; then follow "View Dispute
Resolution Statistics" hyperlink).
1s NASD, CODE OF ARBITRATION R. 10330(e) (1997), available at http://www.finra.org/web/
groups/med_arb/documents/mediationarbitratiori/p018653.pdf.
16 FINRA, Arbitration and Mediation-Tour of the Dispute Resolution Process,
http://www.finra.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (follow "Arbitration & Mediation" hyperlink; then
follow "Dispute Resolution" hyperlink; then follow "Tour of the Dispute Resolution Process"
hyperlink); see also Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 41,065.
17 Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 41,065.
Is Id.
19 Id. at 41,065 n.7.
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What specifically is not included in such an "explained decision" is
"[t]he inclusion of legal authorities or damage calculations .. 2.. 0 The
reason for these exclusions according to the SEC and NASD is that
requiring their inclusion "would significantly increase the processing time
of awards because it would result in the drafting of complex and lengthy
judicial-type decisions." 21 This, in turn, would add more cost to the process
as this would result in payment of "considerably more honoraria" to
arbitrators.22 Currently, arbitrators are paid $200 per session.23
Significantly, only customers and associated persons, not NASD
members, could require explained decisions, although NASD members
could request them. The arbitration panel may or may not comply with
such a request. The reason, according to the Proposed Release, is that this
protects customers and associated persons, because they determine if the
potential cost is worth it and "the prospect that a reviewing court might find
grounds in the explanation to vacate the award. 24
The SEC also noted that while NASD Rule 10323 of the Code provides
that arbitrators shall determine materiality and relevance of evidence,
"NASD intends that, as with current arbitration awards, explained decisions
will have no precedential value in other cases." 25 In fact, NASD plans to
include the following caveat in the award template: "If the arbitrators have
provided an explanation of their decision in this award, the explanation is for
the information of the parties only and is not precedential in nature."26
IV. MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW DOCTRINE
Arbitral explained awards may increase the chance of being overturned
by the courts. Generally, while arbitration awards are "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract "2 courts may challenge the validity of an award
using a statutory vehicle provided in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) or by invoking the
non-statutory manifest disregard of the law doctrine.28
20 Id. at 41,065.
21 Id.
2 Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 41,065.
23 NASD, NASD Dispute Resolution: Frequently Asked Questions, Arbitrator Honorarium
(2006), httpV/www.finra.org/web/groups/med-arb/documents/mediation-arbitration/pO09505.pd.
24 Proposed Rule, supra note 4, at 41,065 (citing Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th
Cir. 2000)).
25 Id. at 41,065 n.8.
26 Id.
27 9 U.S.C. S 2 (2000).
2 9 U.S.C. S 10(a) (2000).
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The statutory reasons to vacate an arbitral award include:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced;
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made;
(5) where an award is vacated and the time within which the
agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the court
may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators. 9
For three decades, federal courts upheld the FAA's grounds for vacatur
holding them to be an exclusive remedy.30 However, in 1953, the Supreme
Court decided Wilko v. Swan.3 The court stated:
[A] failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the
provisions of [relevant law] would 'constitute grounds for vacating
the award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,' that
failure would need to be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted
submission [to arbitration] ... the interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard [of the law] are not subject,
in the federal courts, tojudicial review for error in interpretation.32
The Wilko court suggested a potential for an alternative means of
vacating an arbitral award based upon the manifest disregard standard. The
opinion suggested that if the arbitrators "manifestly disregarded" the law, as
opposed to merely misinterpreting it, that might provide grounds for
vacatur. Over four decades later, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
29 Id.
30 Gary W. Flanagan, Expanded Grounds for Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 67
DEF. COUNS.J. 488, 489 (2000).
31 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989).
32 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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v. Bobker,3 3 the Second Circuit defined what constituted the manifest
disregard standard-a definition much needed:
The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and
instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an
arbitrator. Moreover, the term 'disregard' implies that the arbitrator
appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but
decides to ignore or pay no attention to it. To adopt a less strict
standard of judicial review would be to undermine our well
established deference to arbitration as a favored method of settling
disputes when agreed to by the parties. Judicial inquiry under the
'manifest disregard' standard is therefore extremely limited. The
governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators must
be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable. We are not at liberty
to set aside an arbitration panel's award because of an arguable
difference regarding the meaning or applicability of laws urged upon
it.
34
"Every federal circuit, except the Fifth Circuit (which declines to adopt any
nonstatutory grounds to set aside awards), expressly recognizes that
'manifest disregard of the law' is an appropriate reason to vacate an
arbitration panel's decision."35 To prove manifest disregard of the law in the
Fifth Circuit, the aggrieved party must show that:
(1) the arbitrators must have 'appreciate [d] the existence of a clearly
governing principle but decided to ignore or pay no attention to it';
(2) 'the governing law ignored by the arbitrators must be well
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable'; and, separately, that (3)
upholding the arbitrator's award would result in a 'significant
injustice.' 36
The Seventh Circuit, however, limited its application to vacate
arbitration orders to instances where the arbitration award directs the parties
33 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
34 Id. at 933-34. The Second Circuit's definition of manifest disregard of the law has been
adopted by most appellate courts.
33 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, 3 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
S 149:4, WL, CMLARB S 149:4 (footnote omitted).
36 Christopher D. Kratoviljudicial Review ofArbitration Awards in the Fifih Circuit, 38 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 471, 486-87 (2007) (footnote omitted).
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to violate the law.37 In Wise v. Wachovia Securities, LLC.,38 investors sought
to vacate an arbitration award in favor of a securities brokerage firm, on the
investors' claim that the firm was liable for a former broker's fraud.
Appellant argued that since there was no evidence to support the award, the
award had to be set aside as being "arbitrary and capricious. "39 On appeal
from the district court affirming the award, Judge Posner did not find
manifest disregard of the law when the arbitration panel did not explain its
decision.40 He reasoned that "arbitrary and capricious" is not a ground for
vacatur listed under FAA. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit defines
"'manifest disregard of the law' so narrowly that it fits comfortably under the
first clause of the fourth statutory ground-'where the arbitrators exceeded
their powers.' '4' Additionally, the Seventh Circuit defined cases where
"arbitrators exceed [] their powers" solely as cases in which arbitrators "direct
the parties to violate the law."42 Since there was no instruction to violate the
law, the arbitration award was affirmed. Judge Posner further added:
When parties agree to arbitrate their disputes they opt out of the
court system, and when one of them challenges the resulting
arbitration award he perforce does so not on the ground that the
arbitrators made a mistake but that they violated the agreement to
arbitrate, as by corruption, evident partiality, exceeding their powers,
etc.-conduct to which the parties did not consent when they
included an arbitration clause in their contract. That is why in the
typical arbitration ... the issue for the court is not whether the
contract interpretation is incorrect or even wacky but whether the
arbitrators had failed to interpret the contract at all, for only then
were they exceeding the authority granted to them by the contract's
arbitration clause. 43
In Tennessee, the Tennessee Supreme Court found "that the FAA
contains no express provision preempting the entire field of arbitration;
37 See OEHMKE, supra note 35 (citing George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577,
581 (7th Cir. 2001)) ("[T]he 'manifest disregard' principle is limited to two possibilities: an arbitral
order requiring the parties to violate the law (as by employing unlicensed truck drivers), and an arbitral
order that does not adhere to the legal principles specified by contract, and hence unenforceable under
S 10(a)(4)."). Id. at 581.
38 450 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 2006).
39 Id. at 268.
40 Id. at 268-69.
41 Id. at 268.
42 Id. at 268-69.
43 Id. at 269 (citations omitted).
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therefore, in Tennessee, a court limits its review strictly to the four vacatur
standards under FAA § 10(a). "4
The definition of manifest disregard of the law begs the question: can
one successfully allege manifest disregard of the law if an arbitration award
contains no explanatory language?4' For example, in UBS Warburg LLC v.
Auerbach, Pollak & Richardson, Inc., the New York Supreme Court granted a
motion to vacate an arbitration award. 46 The court cited to an arbitration
record, which served as the premise to the court's conclusion that the panel
manifestly disregarded the law.47 Assuming that the record contained no
such explanatory language, could the court hold that the arbitration panel
manifestly disregarded the law?
Not in Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Services., Inc.,"4 in which, after an
arbitration panel wrote a thirty-nine page opinion finding the defendant
liable,49 the defendant moved to vacate the arbitration awardi 0 In addition
to the liability award, the arbitrators awarded plaintiffs attorneys' fees and
costs, by clearly disregarding the law.5' Under applicable state statutes, the
44 OEHMKE, supra note 35; see also Warbington Constr., Inc. v. Franklin Landmark, L.L.C., 66
S.W.3d 853, 854, 858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that Tennessee courts have declined to adopt the
non-statutory grounds ofeither "manifest disregard" or "public policy" for reviewing arbitration awards
in FAA cases).
45 See generally Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Marc J. Greenspon, Securities Arbitration: Bankrupt,
Bothered and Bewildered, 7 STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN. 131, 146-52 (2002).
46 No. 119163/00, 2001 WL 1586978, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2001).
47 Id. at *3. The court cited the following record:
[Counsel for UBS]: I have a question about the briefs... We're going to be citing
case law and regulatory authorities in the brief. Would it be useful for the panel for us to
supply copies of the things that we cite, so that you don't have to look them up yourselves?
[Counsel for APR]: I don't believe we have an objection to that. I think it's really
a question of what the panel would want. If you are going to be reading these cases--
[Arbitrator]: I am not. I'm not going to read it.
[Arbitrator]: Excuse me, but I never heard of a rule that says in accounting that
you have to enter prospective charge [sic] just because you know it is going to come down.
[Counsel for UBS]: Well, Ms. Kunzler, I could give you of the uniform net
capital rule [sic], 15c3-1, and the uniform net capital rule specifically says you have to take
a charge against liabilities that you know you have, even though you haven't been called to
put up the money.
48 Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., Inc., 40 F. App'x 364 (9th Cir. 2002).
49 Koruga v. Ming Wang, Docket No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2, 2000).
50 Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., Inc., 183 F. Supp 2d 1245, 1246 (D. Or. 2001).
s1 Id at 1247. See Cane, supra note 45, at 154-57; see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 886 A.2d 46, 49 n.13 (Del. Ch. 2005) (comparing Koruga). See generally Katz v. Fin. Clearing
& Servs. Corp., 794 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Dillon v. Militano, 731 F. Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Carlson v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., 906 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1990); Schober v. Dep't of Labor, 97 CIV.
8623 (DLC), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6844, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1999).
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claimants had to prove the defendant was a broker-dealer that materially
aided in the sale.52 In researching the statutory definition of "broker-dealer"
and "material," the panel disregarded well-settled case law, which stated that
the functions performed by clearing firms that the Koruga panel labeled as
"material" are "ministerial."53 The United States District Court for the
District of Oregon denied a motion to vacate the award.' 4 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit produced a somewhat unusual
opinion-stating that this Ninth Circuit opinion could not be cited as
precedent-and affirmed the district court's holding.5 The court of appeals
held that the arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard applicable law
and that the defendant was responsible for reasonable attorneys' fees.
5 6
V. STUDIES, COMMENTARIES ON THE PROPOSED RULE CHANGE
Some believe that when parties agree to arbitration without providing
for a reasoned award, they waive any right to an explanation or clarification
of the award.57 Furthermore, requiring arbitrators to explain their reasoning
undermines one purpose of arbitration, which is to provide a relatively
inexpensive, quick, efficient, and informal means of private dispute
settlement."8 The American Arbitration Association does not encourage
arbitrators to write opinions that give their reasons for the award. 9
As discussed above, the NASD proposed rule would allow customers
and brokers in intra-industry disputes to request a written explanation of the
award from the panel. However, one practitioner warns against such
requests, by listing several reasons why "investors and their lawyers should
think twice about requesting such a decision":
First, the reasoned award process is likely to result in delays due to
appeals, and will pose a threat to the award should some court
decide to overturn it....
Second, a poorly-worded decision by an arbitration panel
(particularly a panel composed of two or three non-lawyers) might
52 See Cane, supra note 51, at 155.
53 Id.
54 Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., Inc., 183 F. Supp 2d 1245, 1246 (D. Or. 2001).
55 Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., Inc., 40 F. App'x 364, 365 (9th Cir. 2002).
% Id. at 366.
57 See, e.g., Craig v. Barber, 524 So. 2d 974, 976-77 (Miss. 1988) (holding that court order to
compel arbitrator to explain arbitration award in response to claim that arbitrator exhibited evident
partiality was improper) (later proceeding, 558 So. 2d 863 (Miss. 1990)).
58 See, e.g., Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972).
59 44 Am. Jur. Trials 507, 10(A) S 81.
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provide meritorious grounds for a brokerage firm to challenge the
award when no such grounds would otherwise have existed.
Third, the issuance of reasoned awards by arbitration panels could
lead to the creation of securities arbitration common law. Currently,
arbitration awards have no precedential value in other cases. While
arbitrators are encouraged to review and follow the law, there is no
strict requirement that they do. Thus, it is likely that if a customer
in one case received a "zero" award and a reasoned decision, that
decision could be used against investors with similar cases as
grounds to deny them awards.
Fourth, where an investor receives an award of punitive damages
and requests a reasoned decision, there is likely to be greater
scrutiny by a reviewing court given the recent United States
Supreme Court decision limiting punitive damages. A punitive
damage reasoned award also is more likely to be appealed by a
brokerage firm, particularly where a decision is either poorly
worded or is not in strict compliance with the Supreme Court
decision.60
Furthermore, this author argues, "[r] easoned awards will create a paper
trail or track record upon which customers and the securities industry will
judge potential panelists. Thus, transparency may chill arbitrators who might
otherwise issue pro-investor reasoned awards."
61
Other commentators, while realizing the need for more transparency
in the securities industry, are opposing the rule for several novel reasons.'
The rule's adoption, they argue, "may be largely cosmetic if it does not
improve the securities arbitration process itself, but merely [improves]
claimants' perceptions of the process." 63 There are internal reasons why the
proposal should not occur. If an arbitrator is "philosophically opposed to
writing explanations" he or she will be unable to withdraw from the process
since the "request for a written explanation [can be made] as late as [twenty]
days prior to the first scheduled hearing date, after NASD already has
appointed arbitrators and when it is too late for arbitrators to decline the
60 Jacob H. Zamansky, A "Reasoned" Arbitration Decision? Be Careful What You Wish For,
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE (Feb. 2005)., available at WL 8 No.
9 GLWSLAW 8 (footnote omitted).
61 Id.
62 See generally Barbara Black &Jill Gross, The ExplainedAward of Damocles: Protection or Peril in
Securities Arbitration, 34 SEC. REG. L.J. 17 (2006).
63 Id.
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case."' In addition, the language of the proposal "does not provide
sufficient guidance to arbitrators about how to craft the award. It merely
defines an explained decision as a 'fact-based award stating the reasons each
alleged cause of action was granted or denied' and states that an explanation
need not include legal authorities or damage calculations."6' Notwithstand-
ing any possible detrimental effects of the proposal, these commentators do
find some clear benefits.' For example, being able to see previous written
explanations would allow parties to see how arbitrators previously decided
controversies, which would then provide "valuable information for parties
to use when ranking and striking arbitrators during arbitrator selection in
future cases. "67
Since NASD's filing of the proposal to amend the rule, the SEC received
numerous commentaries both praising and condemning the proposed
action.68 NASAA, for example, favors the rule change because "[it] will
serve a number of important goals. It will improve the quality of arbitration,
in that decision makers who must explain their thinking tend to arrive at
more fair and correct results. Courts and commentators alike have noted
that explanations improve the adjudicative process. "69 In addition, NASAA
argues for both the requirement of explained decisions, as well as the
inclusion of legal authorities and damage calculations in the awards, two
items which are excluded from the proposed rule.
70
NASAA believes that inclusion of legal authorities and damage
calculations in written arbitration opinions are important to "achieve more
fully the benefits that written decisions can offer: fair outcomes, enhanced
investor confidence, a meaningful basis for appeal, and the evolution of a
securities jurisprudence in arbitration cases. Without this additional
requirement, the rule amendment will fall short of its objectives."7'
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Comments on File No. SR-NASD-2005-032, available at http'/www.sec.gov/rules/sro/
nasd/nasd2005032.shtml.
69 Letter from Franklin L. Widmann, President, NASAA, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC
2 (Sept. 13, 2005), available at http//www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/nasd2005032/flwidmann5172.pdf
[hereinafter NASAA Letter] (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 411 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 897 (1981) (the findings required under FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) "insure care on the part of the
trialjudge in ascertaining the facts"); Cane, supra note 44, at 160 (opinions demonstrate that the arbitrator
thoughtfully contemplated each claim)).
70 NASAA Letter, supra note 69, at 1-3.
71 Id. at 3.
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In addition, NASAA urges the industry to dispense with the
requirement that written explanations be requested by one of the parties.72
Currently, a party must request an explanation of an award; it is not
automatic.73  NASAA cites two reasons. First, procedurally, "investors,
especially those appearing without counsel, may not understand their right
to request an explanation of the award."74 Second, if the proposed twenty
day request requirement is retained, it needs to be corrected to avoid conflict
with the proposed amendment to Rule 10330(j)(4), which provides that
"any [request for a written explanation of an award] must be made 'no later
than the time for the pre-hearing exchange of documents and witness lists
under Rule 10321(c).' 75
A different practitioner, in condemning the proposed rule, points out
that "[a] rbitration is best understood as the last-resort method of settling
disputes, rather than as an alternative method of deciding cases.... It will
make it harder for arbitrators to impose settlements, because settlements,
unlike determinations or decisions, will always be difficult if not impossible
to explain with 'reasons. ' ', 76  In addition, this practitioner argues that a
reasoned opinion may not be fair. For example, a reason might read like
this: "We find by a preponderance of the evidence that the customer
received statements in time to disavow the trade and failed to do so.
Therefore, the trade was ratified and the customer's claim is dismissed." Or
it could be the converse. Either way, it would make for a perfectly
"reasoned" result. But would either result be fair? Generally speaking, no.'
Some practitioners believe that arbitration is a fair and equitable forum
to resolve disputes. 78 A.G. Edwards, in its letter to the SEC, cited several
studies, which appeared to show that participants in the arbitration process
believed that the forum and process during their cases was fair.79 A.G.
Edwards laid out two concepts explaining why some call for a rule change.
They are "public perception" problems and an increase in appeals.' °
72 Id. at4.
73 Seegenerally Proposed Rule, supra note 4.
74 NASAA Letter, supra note 69, at 4.
75 Id.
76 Aegis J. Frumento, Can't Get No Satisfaction! How Explained Decisions Will Undermine the
Arbitration Process, 3 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, 2 (2005).
77 Id. at 5.
78 Letter from Stephen G. Sneeringer, Senior Vice President & Counsel, A.G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (July 28, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/
nasd2005032/sgsneeringerO72805.pdf [hereinafter A.G. Edwards Letter].
79 Id.
80 Id.
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A.G. Edwards cites to The General Accounting Office ("GAO"), which
issued a report' that reviewed arbitration decisions from January 1989 to
June 1990: "The GAO found no statistically significant difference between
results in industry-sponsored arbitrations versus American Arbitration
Association arbitrations noting that investors prevailed 59% of the time."8
2
The GAO again reviewed decisions during the period of 1992 through 1998
in its report and came to the same findings: "The vast majority strongly
agreed that their cases were handled fairly and without bias. In fact, more
claimants than respondents felt that their cases were handled justly and
equitably."'3
Further, A.G. Edwards cites to another study conducted by The
Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA") that collects and
processes data received from commercial arbitrations:
Reviewing this data yields no evidence indicating that one party is
favored in arbitration. In fact, the award results have remained
surprisingly consistent over 20-plus years notwithstanding the
numerous changes that have been made to the definitions of who is
a "public arbitrator" versus a "non-public or industry arbitrator."
Most of these changes were again made to assuage negative
"perceptions" ofself-regulatory organization ("SRO") arbitrations."'
According to A.G. Edwards:
[I]ndependent studies, data and conclusions all verify that SRO
arbitrations are fair, just, and equitable and that the public agrees
with this conclusion. Notwithstanding empirical evidence, certain
individuals and the media continue to claim that there is a public
"perception" problem that needs to be addressed.... Edwards does
not believe that rule making is the proper methodology to respond
81 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: HOWINVESTORS FARE, REP.
No. GAO/GGD- 92-74 (1992).
82 A.G. Edwards Letter, supra note 77, at 2.
83 Id. See also See Gary Tidwell, Kevin Foster & Michael Hummel, Party Evaluation ofArbitrators:
An Analysis of Data Collected fom NASD Regulation Arbitrators 3 (1999).
94 A.G. Edwards Letter, supra note 78, at 2 (citing Michael A. Perino, Report to the Securities and
Exchange Commission Regarding Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities
Arbitrations, Recommendation Two (2002)).
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to negative publicity, particularly when that publicity may be
inaccurate or biased."
When addressing the written opinion issue, A.G. Edwards believes that
even if one out of a hundred or a thousand opinions "lacks the
communicative skill to clearly transmit the arbitrators' logic and reasoning,
that written opinion will be the subject of commentary, analysis, and
possible derision by the same individuals and media who currently contend
that there is a public 'perception' problem."86 Additionally, A.G. Edwards
argues that the arbitration process is equitable in nature, rendering awards
in times where legal remedies may not be available.87 This would lead to an
increase in appeals at the court level since the chance of successful litigation
is greater if an award contains a written explanation.'
Another commentator proposes to reject the rule change, and "in its
place erect rules and procedures that actually do increase the transparency
and fairness of securities arbitration."' This author points out that
arbitrators often do not take notes and they do not ask questions. In the
worst instances, arbitrators have been known to not pay attention to the
hearing or even fall asleep. "Arbitrators have been known to mischaracterize
testimony or written statements that have just been presented."' "The
proposed 'written explanation' is nothing like ajudge's written explanation.
It will not necessary [sic] explain fact finding, law, or damages. It will not
increase transparency or fairness. In fact, it will further deceive and cheat
customers and employees."
9 1
Like other opponents of the rule change, Mr. Skora lists potential
problems with NASD procedures. 1.) Since arbitrators are not required to
provide written explanations, they have no incentive to understand and
study the facts of the case. . .-. [B]y not writing out a cogent explanation,
arbitrators are not forced to ensure that their perception of the facts is
reliable and their legal reasoning (or some other reasoning) is sound.9
85 A.G. Edwards Letter, supra note 78, at 3.
96 Id. at4.
87 Id. at 5 ("Ifa written award is required, a decision granted on 'equitable' fairness will have to
be substantiated by the facts. The facts will also have to substantiate the monetary award granted.
Edwards does not believe the public customer will be well served by the scrutiny that will accompany
such written justifications for those awards.").
88 Id. at 4-6.
89 Letter from Richard Skora to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Aug. 3, 2005), available at
http//www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/nasd2005032/rkskoraO8O3O5.pdf [hereinafter Skora Letter].
90 Id. at 2.
91 Id. at 1.
9 Id. at2.
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2.) [O]ften arbitrators are not considering the law.93 3.) [T]here is no
database for the SEC or any other group to review arbitrators' competence
and integrity. And there is no record for customers and employees and their
counsels to know the legal basis (or any other basis) that arbitrators are using
to decide awards." 94 4.) "Arbitrators are hiding gross incompetence and bias
towards the securities firms when omitting any written explanation." 9
On the one hand, it appears that this commentator is a proponent of the
rule change, which would require the written arbitration awards. However,
that is not the case. This commentator is actually suggesting that the
proposed rule is "too vague to know what the NASD means by a written
decision." 96 This commentator is warning the industry that boiler-plate
explanations will be included in the awards, which will defeat the purpose
of the proposed rule change. By way of an example, a panel could write the
following explanation: "The arbitration panel rejected the customer's (or employee's)
version offacts and accepted the securities firm's version. We deny all of the customer's
(or employee's, respectively) claims."97 This commentator argues, and quite
successfully, that such an explanation in reality would not be a "written
explanation in any legal sense."9 Mr. Skora concludes that since the
proposed rule change would do no good, it is "insulting to our
intelligence."99
VI. OTHER ARBITRATION FIELDS
Written awards are not rare in other specialized arbitration-such as
labor, maritime and international arbitration-and are even encouraged. 1°°
Attorneys often give "written arbitration opinions to their clients to permit
the client to see for themselves that the arbitrator listened to the evidence
and acted rationally based upon the evidence in the record."
10
'
In an employment setting, an employer may include a mandatory
arbitration clause mandating any dispute under an employment agreement
to be resolved by arbitration.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
9 Id. at3.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at6.
100 See EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE
ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE 494 (LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2001).
101 Id. at 495.
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Possibly to prevent injustice, in 1994 President Clinton appointed a
commission to address the following concerns over fairness of the
employment arbitration process:
• What (if any) new methods or institutions should be
encouraged, or required, to enhance workplace productivity
through labor-management cooperation and employee
participation?
" What (if any) changes should be made in the present legal
framework and practices of collective bargaining to enhance
cooperative behavior, improve productivity, and reduce conflict
and delay?
* What (if anything) should be done to increase the extent to
which workplace problems are directly resolved by the parties
themselves, rather than through recourse to state and federal
courts and governmental bodies? °2
The Commission found that:
[I]f private arbitration is to serve as a legitimate form of private-
sector enforcement of public employment law, arbitration policies
must provide:
* a neutral arbitrator who knows the laws in question and
understands the concerns of the parties,
* a fair and simple method by which the employee can obtain the
necessary information to present his or her claim,
* a fair method of cost-sharing between the employer and
employee to ensure affordable access to the system for all
employees,
• the right to independent representation if the employee wants
it,
• a range of legal remedies equal to those available through
litigation,
* a written opinion by the arbitrator explaining his or her
rationale for the decision, and
102 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. 95-150, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
MOST PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 5 (1995), available at
http//www.gao.gov/archive/1995/he95150.pdf.
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sufficient judicial review to ensure that the result is consistent
with employment laws.' °3
Most relevant to this article, the Commission found that the "the
arbitrator should issue a written opinion that states the findings of fact and
reasons that led to his or her decision. This opinion need not correspond in
style or length to a court opinion.... However, it should set out, in
understandable terms, the basis for the arbitrator's ruling."'O
The Judiciary answered this report by adopting some of the
Commission's standards. For example, California courts, decidingwhether
to enforce an employee arbitration agreement, now use the following
analysis:
Arbitration agreements in the employer-employee context must
provide for: (1) neutral arbitrators, (2) more than minimal
discovery, (3) a written award, (4) all types of relief that would
otherwise be available in court, and (5) no additional costs for the
employee beyond what the employee would incur if he or she were
bringing the claim in court.'05
Similarly, District of Columbia courts hold that the following safeguards
are needed in order for an employment arbitration contract to be valid:
(1) a neutral arbitrator;
(2) more than minimal discovery;
(3) a written award;
(4) all types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and
(5) no requirement that employees pay either unreasonable costs or
any arbitrator's fees or expenses as a condition of access to the
arbitration forum. 10 6
103 Id. (emphasis added).
104 Id. at 14-15.
105 See, e.g., Fitz v. NCR Corp., 118 Cal. App. 4th 702,712-13 (2004) (emphasis added) (voiding
employment arbitration contract for lack of procedural safeguards).
106 Sapiro v. VeriSign, 310 F.Supp. 2d 208,214 (D.D.C. 2004) (emphasis added). See also Cole
v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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VII. CONCLUSION
It is evident that NASD is attempting to find a compromise between
fairness (which requires a reasoned explanation ofan arbitration award, even
if it is without a discussion of legal authority and damage calculations) and
efficiency of the arbitration proceedings (which requires a swift proceeding
and a reduced likelihood of an appeal) in its attempt to amend the rule
requiring arbitrators to provide reasoned explanations for their awards.
Strangely enough, however, NASD wishes the written awards to have no
precedential value whatsoever-the underlying basis of our legal system.
While the future of the proposed rule is unknown, should it be approved, it
will probably still be considered a step toward greater transparency and
accountability for both arbitrators and the securities industry.
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APPENDIX A: NASD PURPOSE STATEMENT107
The purpose of the proposed rule change is to amend the Code of
Arbitration Procedure (Code) to provide written explanations in arbitration
awards upon the request of customers, or of associated persons in industry
controversies.
Currently, Rule 10330(e) of the Code requires only that arbitration
awards contain the names of the parties and counsel; a summary of the
issues; the damages and other relief requested and awarded; a statement of
any other issues resolved; the names of the arbitrators; the dates the claim
was filed and the award rendered; the location, number, and dates of hearing
sessions; and the signatures of the arbitrators concurring in the award.'08
Arbitrators may also include the rationale underlying their decision in the
award, but they are not required to do so"° and, therefore, usually do not
provide an explanation. 10
Arbitration parties occasionally raise the issue of the lack of written
explanations or opinions in arbitration awards. Specifically, customers and
associated persons who lose in arbitration (or consider their recovery
insufficient) often request written explanations or opinions from the
arbitrators. Since these requests are usually made after the awards are issued,
arbitrators are unlikely to provide them because they were not advised in
advance that they would be writing an explained award and do not want to
undermine their award. The lack of reasoning or explanations in awards is
one of the most common complaints of non-prevailing participants in
NASD's arbitration forum.
In order to increase investor confidence in the fairness of the NASD
arbitration process, NASD is proposing to amend the Code to allow
customers or associated persons in industry controversies to require an
explained decision."' An explained decision will constitute a fact-based
award that states the reason(s) each alleged cause of action was granted or
denied and will address all claims involved in the case, whether brought by
the party requesting the explained decision or another party. The inclusion
107 The text below and the foomotes that follow are taken verbatim from NASD proposed rule
change § 3 "Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the
Proposed Rule Change", page 8, Mar. 15, 2005.
JOB Pursuant to Rule 10214, awards in intra-industry cases involving employment discrimination
claims also shall include "a statement regarding the disposition of any statutory claim(s)."
109 NASD is proposing to codify this policy in Rule 10330(i).
Ito The United States Supreme Court has found that there is no general requirement for an
arbitrator to explain the reasons for an award. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
II A customer or associated person may require an explained decision regardless of whether he
or she is the claimant or respondent in the arbitration.
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of legal authorities or damage calculations, however, will not be required in
an explained decision in order to limit the additional costs and processing
time associated with explained decisions. Specifically, requiring the inclusion
of legal authorities and damage calculations would significantly increase the
processing time of awards because it would result in the drafting of complex
and lengthy judicial-type decisions. This, in turn, would require the
payment of considerably more honoraria to arbitrators. NASD believes that
requiring only the fact-based reasons underlying an award in explained
decisions will provide customers and associated persons with the
information that they desire while at the same time maintaining the speed
and thrift of arbitration. 2
Although customers, and associated persons in industry controversies,
will be able to require the issuance of explained decisions, NASD members
will not have the ability to do so. Limiting the parties that can require an
explained decision in this manner will protect customers and associated
persons, because they alone will determine whether to request an explained
decision while bearing in mind the potential costs and the prospect that a
reviewing court might find grounds in the explanation to vacate the award. 3
Furthermore, providing member firms with the ability to request explained
decisions could result in conflicts between co-respondents who may disagree
on whether to request a decision. NASD members will be able to request
that a panel issue an explained decision but, unlike those situations involving
customers and associated persons, the arbitrator(s) will not be required to
comply with the request.
In addition, parties will not be able to require explained decisions in two
types of arbitration proceedings. The first is simplified arbitrations that are
decided solely upon the pleadings and evidence filed by the parties, as
described in Rules 10203 and 10302."' The second is arbitrations that are
conducted under the default procedures provided for in Rule 10314(e).
Explained decisions would not be appropriate in either of these situations
due to the abbreviated nature of these arbitration proceedings.
Under the proposed rule, an eligible party that wishes to require an
explained decision must make his or her request at least 20 calendar days
prior to the first scheduled hearing date. This is the same time frame for the
112 NASD estimates that arbitrators will be able to render explained decisions within the 30
business day timeframe currently set forth in Rule 10330(d).
113 See, e.g., Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000), ("Arbitrators are not
required to explain their decisions. If they choose not to do so, it is all but impossible to determine
whether they acted with manifest disregard of the law.") (citation omitted).
114 An eligible party may request an explained decision if there is a hearing in a simplified
arbitration proceeding.
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parties to exchange documents and lists of the witnesses that they intend to
present at the hearing, which is set forth in Rule 10321(c). NASD believes
that this time frame provides eligible parties with sufficient time to
determine whether they would like to request an explained decision and also
allows arbitrators adequate notice that a case will require an explained
decision. Any requests for an explained decision that are made after the
deadline, including any post-award requests, would be granted only where
the arbitrators agree to provide them after reviewing all the parties'
arguments on the issue.
Since cases involving an explained decision will require additional time
and effort on the part of arbitrators, the proposed rule provides each
arbitrator with an additional $200 honorarium for cases in which an
explained decision is required under Rule 103300). The panel will allocate
$100 of each arbitrator's honorarium to the parties as part of the final award,
along with the other allocable fees. NASD will pay the other $100 of each
arbitrator's honorarium in order to help defray the costs associated with
explained decisions. In order to avoid any potential conflict of interest, the
arbitrator(s) will not receive the additional $200 honorarium if the panel
issues an explained decision that is not required by Rule 10330(j). 115
Specifically, NASD does not want to provide a financial incentive for
arbitrators to write an explained decision when they are not required to do
SO.
11 For example, the arbitrator(s) will not receive the additional $200 honorarium for writing an
explained decision pursuant to a NASD member's request or a request made by an eligible party after
the deadline set forth in Rule 10321(c).
2007] "EXPLAINED DECISIONS" 45
APPENDIX B: RULES AFFECTED BY PROPOSED CHANGE
The proposed rule change will affect the following rules:
a. Rule IM-10104. Arbitrators' Honorarium
b. Rule 10321. General Provisions Governing Pre-Hearing
Proceedings
c. Rule 10214. Awards
d. Rule 10330. Awards
e. Rule 10332. Schedule of Fees for Customer Disputes (ACE
NOTE-Should this list of rules be in the same order as
presented in the original document? See website referenced in
FN i, above).
NASD proposes to include the following language in the rules below.116
1. Rule IM-10104. Arbitrators' Honorarium
Adds the following sentence at the end:
Each arbitrator shall receive an additional honorarium of $200 for a case
requiring an explained decision under Rule 10330(").
2. Rule 10214. Awards
Places current text under subsection (a) & adds the following subsection:
(b) A current or former associated person may request an explained decision
under Rule 103300).
3. Rule 10321. General Provisions Governing Pre-Hearing
Proceedings
(c) Pre-Hearing Exchange and Explained Decision Requests
116 For purposes ofthis Article, NASD's proposed text will be underlined, and other explanatory
sentences will be in italics.
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Places current text under subsection (1) & adds the following subsection:
(2) At least twenty (20) calendar days prior to thefirst scheduled hearing date,
a customer or an associated person in an industry controversy must submit any
request for an explained decision under Rule 103300).
4. Rule 10330. Awards
Adds the following subsections:
(i) The award may contain the rationale underlying the award.
0) Explained Decisions
(1) The following individuals may require the arbitrator(s) to
provide an explained decision: 117
(A) Customers (whether claimants or respondents); and
(B) Associated persons (whether claimants or respondents)
in industry controversies.
(2) An explained decision is afact-based award stating the reason(s)
each alleged cause of action was granted or denied. Inclusion of
legal authorities and damage calculations is not required.
(3) Customers and associated persons must make any requestfor an
explained decision no later than the time for the pre-hearing
exchange of documents and witness lists under Rule 10321(c).
(4) Each arbitrator will receive an additional honorarium of $200
for writing an explained decision as required by this paragraph
("). The panel will allocate $100 of each arbitrator's additional
honorarium to the parties as part of the final award.
(5) An explained decision will relate to all claims involved in the
case, whether brought by the requesting party or another party.
(6) This paragraph (j) will not apply to simplfited cases decided
without a hearing under Rules 10203 or 10302, or to default
cases conducted under Rule 10314(e).
117 NASD's proposed change lists these two items under headings "(A)" and "(b)".
